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CAN THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT OVERCOME 
THE POLITICAL QUESTION HURDLE? 
Po Liang Chen & Jordan T. Wada 
  Abstract:   In 1947, a new Japanese Constitution (“Kenpō”) was born and its 
pacifist ideal was embodied in Article 9.  Meanwhile, judicial review was transplanted, 
mainly from the United States (“U.S.”), into Japan.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has 
narrowed its political question doctrine since Baker v. Carr in 1962, Japan developed its 
constitutional avoidance and political question doctrine in part to avoid deciding the 
merits of Article 9 disputes, including the legitimacy of Japan’s Self-Defense Force, the 
Security Treaty between the US and Japan, and the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.  
The Japanese Supreme Court (“SCJ”) adopted a deferential temperament to maintain 
stability with the political branches, thereby abdicating an effective means of settling 
critical disputes by routinely allowing executive interpretations of the Kenpō to stand 
unchallenged.  Under the auspices of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an executive 
reinterpretation of Article 9 in July of 2014 sparked intense debate over the Kenpō’s 
fundamental principle of pacifism; it nearly divided Japan.  In order to stimulate 
constitutional checks and balances, SCJ should seize the role of authoritative interpreter 
of the Kenpō.  An important step in this direction can be accomplished by reexamining 
the unique text and history of the Kenpō and the development of political question 
doctrine in Japan.  As the U.S. acted as Japan’s transplant donor of judicial review, the 
development of the U.S. political question doctrine could offer a model for SCJ to 
reconsider the weight of textual and historical considerations.  We recommend that SCJ 
restate and clarify its political question doctrine using the development of the U.S. 
political question doctrine as a model.   Further, agreeing to hear an Article 9 case will 
allow SCJ to play an active role in furtherance of a constructive dialogue between the 
government and the people to form a new consensus on its national security strategies 
and move Japan forward. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of World War II, the current Constitution of Japan (the 
“Kenpō”) was enacted under unusual circumstances, coordinately drafted by 
United States (“U.S.”) and Japanese legal experts.1  The Kenpō is known as 
the pacifist Constitution and this principle is expressed substantively in the 
Kenpō’s Preamble and in Article 9.2  Article 9, Paragraph 1, provides, “the 
                                                      
  Po Liang Chen is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law; Jordan Wada 
is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law; we would like to thank Professors 
Tatsuhiko Yamamoto, and Satoshi Yokodaido, and Lisa Manheim for their crisp guidance and the editorial 
staff of the Washington International Law Journal for all of their support. 
1  KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] II, 13 (1972). 
2  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], preamble (Japan) (providing: “We, the Japanese 
people, . . . resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of 
government . . . We . . . desire peace for all time . . . and we have determined to preserve our security and 
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”). 
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Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” 3  
Article 9, Paragraph 2, the “War Potential Clause,” declares, “[i]n order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”4 
Since the Kenpō’s enactment, the War Potential Clause has invariably 
represented the most controversial issue in Japanese politics.5  Given the 
ambiguity in the War Potential Clause’s language, concern over the 
constitutionality of Japan’s military body—the Self-Defense Force 
(“SDF”)—abounds.6  Similar controversies regarding The Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan7 (“Anpo”) 
and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan compounded.8  Early disputes over 
the SDF, Anpo, and the stationing of U.S. forces comprise three of the most 
prominent factors shaping the field of Japanese politics, and planted seeds of 
dynamic social movements springing up since the 1950s.9   
  On July 1, 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet issued 
an executive reinterpretation of Article 9 (“2014 reinterpretation”).10  The 
                                                      
3   KENPŌ art. 9, para. 1. 
4  Id. at art. 9, para. 2 (“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The right of belligerency of the state will 
not be recognized.”).  The first clause is known as the “war potential clause.” 
5  David S. Law, The Myth of the Imposed Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 245 (Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
6  Shigenori Matsui, Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1375, 1387 (2011) (describing SCJ’s major decision regarding the SDF’s constitutionality, the Sunagawa 
Case) [hereinafter Matsui]. 
7  The Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan was first signed on September 8 1951, 
becoming effective on April 28 1952, the Security Treaty between The United States and Japan, U.S.-
Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329; The Security Treaty was substantially amended in January 1960 by 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in Washington, and retitled the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, U.S.-Japan, 
Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; Nihonkoku to amerika gasshūkoku to no aida no sōgo hoshō oyobi anzen 
hoshō jōyaku, Treaty No. 6 of 1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/q&a/ref/1.html. The most 
controversial provisions are Article 5 Section 1, reading: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack 
against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes”; and Article 6 Section 1: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan 
and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is 
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” 
8  SHINICHI YAMAMURO, KENPŌ 9 JŌ NO SHISO SUIMYAKU [THE HISTORICAL THOUGHTS OF KENPŌ 
ARTICLE 9] (2007). 
9  Takashi Yamada, Zainichibeigun kichi to sunakawa jiken [The US base in Japan and Sunagawa 
Incident], 60 Horitsu Semina 717, (2014). 
10   Kuni no sonritsu o mattou shi, kokumin o mamoru tameno kireme no nai anzen hosho hosei no 
seibi ni tsuite [Regarding Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and 
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government claimed the basic rationale remained the same, but many 
believed this reinterpretation11 substantially shifted the meaning of Article 
9’s War Potential Clause away from its previous interpretation allowing only 
individual self-defense 12  to include collective self-defense. 13   This 2014 
reinterpretation shook the roots of the Kenpō and its pacifist principle.14  
Although the 2014 reinterpretation will not produce a practical impact until 
potential new legislation enables the SDF to undertake acts and redefine its 
relationship with U.S. forces, the reinterpretation was criticized as a 
significant departure from longstanding policy. 15   Most Japanese 
constitutional scholars denounced the 2014 reinterpretation as 
unconstitutional, criticizing the Cabinet for bypassing the process of 
amending the Kenpō.16  Thereafter, dormant social movements reawakened, 
summoning thousands of citizens to the streets, and bringing the issues of 
the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF, Anpo, and stationing of U.S. forces 
back into the political spotlight. 17   A deadlock between the hard-liner 
Cabinet and the pacifist people generated a constitutional crisis.18 
                                                                                                                                                              
Protect Its People], National Security Committee & Cabinet Decision, July 1, 2014, translated in Cabinet 
Secretariat’s website, at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf. 
11  Keigo Komamura, 7. 1 Kakugi kettei shudantekijieiken koshi no gentei-teki yonin – Nihon-gata 
bunpo bun tochi no rekishi-teki shirimetsuretsu [Cabinet decision on July 1st, an acceptance of the right to 
collective self-defense exercise – The historic incoherent with Japanese rule of law], 17 QUARTERLY 
JURIST 100, 105 (2016) [hereinafter Keigo Komamura]. 
12  See Director General of CLB, Tatsuo Sato’s answer at Cabinet Committee of House of 
Representatives, Naikaku in kaigiroku [Cabinet Committee Minutes, House of Representatives], 19th Diet 
Session, No. 20, 2 (Apr. 6, 1954); Director General of CLB, Ichiro Yoshikuni’s answer in the Budget 
Committee of the House of Councilors, Nov. 13, 1972, Sangiin Yosan Iin Kaigiroku [Budget Committee of 
House of Councilors Minutes], 70th Diet Session, No. 5, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1972).   
13  Previously, the SDF could employ self-defense only when Japan was attacked (individual self-
defense).  The 2014 reinterpretation authorizes the Japanese government to mobilize the SDF to defend an 
ally, the U.S., “where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged 
in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack 
depending on its circumstances.” TAKASHI YAMADA, supra note 10; MASAHIRO SAKATA, KENPŌ 9-JŌ TO 
ANPO HŌSEI [KENPŌ ARTICLE 9 AND ANPO LEGAL SYSTEM] 6 (2016). 
14  Yasuo Hasebe, Shudantekijieiken koshi yonin-ron no mondaiten [The problem of the right to 
collective self-defense], in 65 LIBERTY & JUSTICE (9) 8 (Sept. 2014); Toshiyuki Munesue, Shudantekijieiken 
fūkei – 9-jō, zenbun, 13-jō [The right to collective self-defense landscape - Article 9, the preamble, Article 
13], Horitsu Jiho, Vol. 87 No. 12, 33 (Nov. 2015). 
15  Keigo Komamura, supra note 11.  
16  Yasuo Hasebe, supra note 14; Keigo Komamura, supra note 11; MASAHIRO SAKATA, MASAHIRO 
SAKATA, supra note 13, at 1; Asaho Mizushima, Shūdantekijieiken kōshi ga kenpō-jō mitomerarenai riyū 
[The Reason collective self-defense rights are not compatible with KENPŌ], in SHŪDANTEKIJIEIKEN NO NANI 
GA MONDAI KA: KAISHAKU KAIKEN HIHAN 119 (Yasuhiro Okudaira & Jiro Yamaguchi eds. 2014); 
TOSHIHIRO YAMAUCHI, ANZEN HOSHŌ' HŌSEI TO KAIKEN O TOU [THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY LAW AND 
KENPŌ AMENDMENT] 114 (2015). 
17  Lisa Torio, Japan Is Scrapping Its Pacifist Constitution, Despite Massive Public Opposition, THE 
NATION (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/japan-is-scrapping-its-pacifist-constitution-
352 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 26 NO. 2 
 
At this critical moment of constitutional crisis, one of several serious 
obstacles the Supreme Court of Japan (“SCJ”) must overcome to serve as 
Japan’s court of last resort is its own political question doctrine. 19  SCJ 
jurisprudence is fairly characterized as exhibiting judicial restraint, often 
leaving the executive branch as the final interpreter of the Kenpō in 
practice.20  Currently, for both political and legal reasons, no defined route 
for judicial review is established for Article 9 challenges.21  When hearing 
disputes related to defense or foreign policy, especially concerning Anpo and 
stationing of U.S. forces, SCJ justices and sitting in the interior court judges 
have employed the concept of Tochi Koi Ron (“political question 
doctrine”),22 a theory to the effect that certain acts of the Diet done in the 
name of the State or of the government are not subject to the power of 
judicial review.23  This theory is influenced by the U.S. political question 
doctrine24 and acts as one legal barrier preventing the Court from rendering a 
substantive opinion.25  Though Article 81 of the Kenpō grants the Court full 
judicial review power, SCJ has placed little emphasis on this text, and shies 
away from the Kenpō’s framers’ insistence on full judicial review. 
                                                                                                                                                              
despite-massive-public-opposition/; Justin McCurry, New generation of Japanese anti-war protesters 
challenge Abe, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/japanese-anti-war-protesters-challenge-shinzo-abe. 
18  Yasuo Hasebe, supra note 14; Keigo Komamura, supra note 11; McCurry, supra note 17. 
19   KENPŌ, art. 81, para. 1 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine 
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”). 
20  Shigenori Matsui, supra note 6, at 1375 (explaining SCJ’s reluctance to overturn laws or 
government acts).  
21  KENPŌ, art. 81, para. 1; See David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1425, 1428–1448 (2011) (exploring, inter alia, cultural explanations, the status of judges as 
second-class bureaucrats, and political factors as barriers to judicial review).  
22  The concept of acte de gouvernement was initially introduced into Japan from France in 1938, 
interpreted as Tochi Koi Ron [統治行為論].  However, after WWII, the concept of Tochi Koi Ron was 
substantially transformed and influenced by the political question doctrine in the U.S.  The term Tochi Koi 
Ron was also referred to as Seijimondai (political question) [政治問題].  See Yasuhiro Okudaira, Tochi koi 
riron no hihanteki kosatsu [A critical view on the political question doctrine], 45 HORITSU JIHO No.10, 80 
(1973) [hereinafter Yasuhiro Okudaira]; Setsu Kobayashi, Amerikagasshūkoku ni okeru seijimondai ni 
kansuru hanrei no dōkō to jittai [The precedent of political question doctrine in the U.S. and its trends], 53 
HOGAKU KENKYU (3) 381, 382 (1980) [hereinafter Setsu Kobayashi]; AKIRA OSUGA, ET AL., KENPŌ JITEN 
[DICTIONARY OF THE CONSTITUTION] 359 (2001) [hereinafter KENPŌ JITEN]. 
23  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (Katsumi Tarumi J., concurring) (A ruling on the constitutionality of 
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan and 1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty). 
24  Setsu Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 381–82. 
25  Id. (since 1947, SCJ has developed its constitutional avoidance and political question doctrine to 
avoid deciding the merits of disputes related to Article 9, including the legitimacy of the Self-Defense 
Force, the Security Treaty between the US and Japan, and the stationing of U.S. Forces). 
April 2017    Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle? 353 
 
 
Clarifying the political question doctrine in light of U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence could remove one major hurdle that prevents SCJ from 
granting a merits hearing and settling the current constitutional crisis.  
Reexamining the meaning of political questions and contemplating its wane 
in the U.S. Supreme Court could provide SCJ with a jurisprudential basis to 
play a more effective role in interpreting the Kenpō. 26   Part I of this 
comment introduces the historical transplant of judicial review and the 
political question doctrine into Japan.  Part II provides an overview of 
judicial review and the political question doctrine in the U.S., as a 
foundation for comparison.  Part III recommends steps SCJ could take to 
clarify and restate its political question doctrine, and how it might use the 
U.S. political question doctrine’s development from Baker v. Carr (1962) to 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012) as an example when navigating a challenge to 
the 2014 reinterpretation.  We conclude that overcoming the political 
question doctrine will help bring SCJ one step closer to the role of final 
interpreter of the Kenpō to provide clear guidance and produce a 
constructive dialogue among the government, scholars, and the people. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN JAPAN 
The political question doctrine is difficult to distill because it is 
intertwined with debates regarding the boundary of judicial review and the 
proper function of the judicial branch.  Therefore, before reaching the 
political question doctrine in Japan, it will prove useful to review the 
historical context wherein judicial review was transplanted from the U.S. 
into Japan.  This will provide a backdrop to examine the jurisprudential 
evolution of the political question doctrine in Japan, especially in SCJ over 
the past seventy years.    
A.   The Establishment of SCJ and Judicial Review in 1947 
The establishment of Japanese judicial review is swaddled in an 
unusual history.  On August 14, 1945, the Empire of Japan surrendered to 
the United Allies and the U.S. appointed General Douglas MacArthur 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”), marking the end of 
World War II. 27   Under Allied and SCAP supervision, Japanese Prime 
                                                      
26  Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 80. 
27  The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of 
the Constitution,  https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/interpretations-article9.php; GENERAL 
STAFF OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REPORT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR - MACARTHUR IN JAPAN: 
354 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 26 NO. 2 
 
Minister Kijuro Shidehara, appointed Joji Matsumoto chairman of the 
Constitution Research Committee (“Matsumoto Committee”) to amend 
Japan’s Meiji Constitution. 28   The Matsumoto Committee drafted two 
versions of its constitutional amendment. 29   No record exists of any 
Matsumoto Committee member proposing judicial review.  General 
MacArthur was unsatisfied with the Matsumoto Committee’s failure to 
revive democratic tendencies and respect fundamental rights in its proposal; 
he directed the Government Section (“GS”)30 to secretly begin a new draft 
(the “MacArthur proposal”).31  On February 13, 1946, the SCAP formally 
rejected the Matsumoto Committee proposal and presented the until-then-
clandestine MacArthur proposal. 32   Surprising the Japanese government, 
Article 7333 of the MacArthur proposal included a limited version of judicial 
review, reading: 
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort.  Where the 
determination of the constitutionality of any law, order, 
regulation or official act is in question, the judgment of the 
Supreme Court in all cases arising under or involving Chapter 
III [rights of the people] of this Constitution is final; in all other 
cases where determination of the constitutionality of any law, 
ordinance, regulation or official act is in question, the judgment 
of the Court is subject to review by the Diet.34 
After reviewing and deliberating over the MacArthur proposal, the Japanese 
government embraced the idea of full judicial review and insisted on 
removing 35  the MacArthur proposal language that would have limited 
judicial review. 36   During negotiations between the GS and Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                              
THE OCCUPATION: 
MILITARY PHASE: VOLUME I SUPPLEMENT 67 (Washington: GPO, 1966), http://www.history.army.mil/boo
ks/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/Index.htm. 
28  KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] II, 13 (1972) [hereinafter KENZO TAKAYANAGI II]. 
29  YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KENPŌ SAIBAN NO KANOSEI [THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW] 99–115 
(1995). 
30  The Government Section of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers.  
31  KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] I, 40 (1972) [hereinafter KENZO TAKAYANAGI I]. 
32  KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 55. 
33  YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KENPŌ SAIBAN NO KANOSEI [THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW], 97 (1995). 
34  KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 242–245.  
35  RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW 
JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 356 (2002). 
36  KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at 27, 32, 122, 186;  KENZO TAKAYANAGI II,  supra note 28, 
at 242–245. 
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government on March 4–5, 1946, the Japanese government emphasized the 
importance of judicial independence and public reliance on the judicial 
branch, rationales in contrast with the GS’s concern of judicial oligarchy.37  
Thus, the March 6, 1946 draft of the constitution provides, “[t]he Supreme 
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality 
of any law, order, regulation or official act,”–textually identical to Article 81 
of the 1947 Kenpō, which is viewed as the origin of judicial review in 
Japan.38  The March 6, 1946 draft was thereafter written in vernacular, and 
ultimately came into effect on May 3, 1947 as the 1947 Kenpō.39  The birth 
of judicial review in Japan emanates a duality.  On one hand, it is clear that 
judicial review was initiated as a legal transplant from the U.S. rather than 
from Japanese enthusiasm. 40  On the other hand, at the Kenpō’s drafting, 
compared to the McArthur proposal’s limited scope judicial review, the 
framing Japanese scholars and officials all preferred full judicial review, 
employing rationales of judicial independence and public reliance on the 
judicial branch.41  
Following the Kenpō’s enactment, SCJ first took office in August 
1947.42  As with U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in the 
early 19th Century, the issue of drawing the boundary of judicial review 
soon emerged.  In response, the concept of Tochi Koi Ron43 was considered 
and accepted by SCJ.44  Given that the U.S. acted as Japan’s main judicial 
review donor, Japanese scholars and SCJ naturally noted the U.S. political 
question doctrine among their influences. 45   Meanwhile, the weight of 
                                                      
37  KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at 245. 
38  YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, supra note 29, at 112. 
39  JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 365–367 (1999).  
40  Robert Ward, Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1957); 
KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at xxii (explaining “Dr. Matsumoto said he has been forced to accept 
the ‘MacArthur Constitution’ only after a statement was made by the GHQ staff that ‘the person of the 
Emperor could not be guaranteed.’”).  
41  KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 242–245; MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 36. 
42  Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713, 1713 
(2011).  
43  The concept of Tochi Koi Ron was substantially influenced by the political question doctrine in the 
U.S.  See supra note 22. 
44 Id.; Hiroshi Kaneko, Tochi koi [The political question doctrine], 131 JURIST 39, 40 (1957); Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Shō 34 (a) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
3225 (Japan) (Hachiro Fujita, J., & Toshio Irie, J., concurring). 
45  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec 16, 1959, A no.710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (Hachiro Fujita, J., & Toshio Irie, J., concurring) (“[T]here are 
divergent views regarding the origin, the basis for the theory, or the scope of the acts which would fall 
within the purview of such restriction, such is a well established precedent and an accepted academic 
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Article 81’s text and unusual history diminished in SCJ’s political questions 
case law.46  
B. The Sunagawa Case: Japan’s Leading Precedent on the 
Political Question Doctrine 
 Soon after the enactment of the 1947 Kenpō, communism in Far East 
Asia threatened the security of Japan.47  The U.S. government and Japanese 
ruling elites agreed this necessitated the establishment of the Japanese Self-
Defense Force and retention of U.S. forces for Japan to deter potential armed 
attacks or internal riots.48  As a result of this decision, SCJ had to face three 
main types of constitutional challenges brought under the Kenpō’s Article 9, 
Paragraph 2, War Potential Clause: challenges to the SDF, to Anpo, and to 
the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.  
For disputes concerning the legitimacy of SDF, SCJ seemed to fall 
under the influence of the constitutional avoidance principles stated in the 
1936 U.S. Supreme Court case Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,49 
and have not granted a merits hearing on the issue of the SDF’s 
constitutionality.  SCJ first faced a War Potential Clause challenge in the 
National Police Reserve Case (concerning the origin and predecessor of the 
SDF), filed by Japan’s Socialist Party in 1952.50  SCJ dismissed the case and 
held “it could not determine the constitutionality of a law or an official act in 
the abstract and in the absence of any concrete legal dispute.”51  
  In contrast to the constitutional avoidance analysis deployed on the issue 
of the legitimacy of SDF, SCJ adopted the political question doctrine in 
disputes involving Anpo and the stationing of U.S. forces.52  SCJ initially 
                                                                                                                                                              
theory in the European and American countries, as may be perceived from such expressions 
as. . .  ‘political question’, appearing in American cases.”). 
46  SETSU KOBAYASHI, SEIJIMONDAI NO HŌRI [THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE] 108 (1988). 
47  The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of 
the Constitution, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/interpretations-article9.php. 
48  Id.  
49  Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ 
[CONSTITUTION] 511, 512 (2000). 
50  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Volume 6, Issue 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 783 (Japan). 
51  Id.; see also SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46. 
52  MOTOAKI HATAKE, KENKYŪ TO GIRON NO SAIZENSEN [KENPŌ ARTICLE 9 - FRONTIERS OF 
RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION], 94-95 (2006). 
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adopted the political question doctrine in the 1959 Sunagawa Case. 53   
Japanese scholars have achieved consensus that the Sunagawa Case 
concerned political questions jurisprudence, and they continue to debate how 
far its political questions implications extend.54  In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ 
invoked what it understood as the spirit of the political question doctrine to 
avoid the political controversy of whether Anpo and retaining U.S. forces in 
Japan violated the War Potential Clause.55  Thereafter, the political question 
doctrine became a legal barrier to further Article 9 challenges.56   
  In autumn of 1957, seven demonstrators protesting the expansion of a 
military base in the town of Sunagawa were charged with trespassing on a 
U.S. air base.57  Their protest violated Article 2 of the Special Criminal Law, 
criminalizing trespasses against military bases stationing U.S. armed forces. 
58   The case soon gained public attention because the Special Criminal Law 
raised an Article 9 issue:  whether the authoritative basis of the Special 
Criminal Law, the 1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty, which allowed 
the stationing of U.S. forces, violated the War Potential Clause. 59   The 
Tokyo District Court acquitted the protesters on March 30, 1959, holding the 
1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty’s allowance of U.S. military 
personnel in Japan violated Article 9, Paragraph 2.60  The Tokyo District 
                                                      
53  The term “political question doctrine” was not formally referred to in the judicial opinion. 
However, the spirit of the political question doctrine is apparent. See Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional 
Borrowing and Political Theory, INTL. J. OF CONST. L. 224, 226 (2003),  
54KISABURO YOKOTA, IKEN SHINSA [THE JUDICIAL REVIEW] 83 (1968);  SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra not
e 46, at 139–41; AKIRA OSUGA, supra note 22, at 359–60. 
55  CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 225 (2003); 
NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ SOSHO GENDAI-TEKI TENKAI [THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 129, 132 (1981); KISABURO YOKOTA,  IKEN SHINSA supra note 54;  See 
Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 75; Obayashi Keigo, Seijimondai no hōri no yukue [The Future of 
Political Question Doctrine], 87 Hōgaku Kenkyū No. 2, 198; Masaomi Kimizuka, Tochi Koi-Ron Saikō —
Aru Ga Nai [Reconsidering Political Question Doctrine —To Be or Not to Be], 22 YOKOHAMA L. REV. 33 
(2013); AKIRA OSUGA, supra note 22, at 55; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no.710, 13 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). Id. 
56  Tsunemasa Arikawa, Hōri Saikōsai tōchikōi [The Principle of Law, The Supreme Court, and 
Political Question], 87 HORITSU JIHO No. 5, 4 (2015); Yasuo Hasebe, Sunakawa jiken hanketsu ni okeru 
tōchi kōi-ron [The Political Question Doctrine in Sunagawa Case], 87 HORITSU JIHO No. 5, 44 (2015). 
57  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). 
58  Nipponkoku to Amerikagasshūkoku to no ma no anzen hoshōjōyaku daisanjo ni motodzuku 
gyosei kyōtei ni tomonau keiji tokubetsu-ho [Special Criminal Act due to the security treaty Administrative 
Agreement between Japan and the United States of America under Article 3], Law No. 138 of 1952, art. 2 
(Japan). 
59  KENPŌ, art. 9, para. 2. 
60  Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 30, 1959, Sho 32 (wa) no. 367, 368, 1 KAKYŪ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI SAIBAN REISŪ [KAKEISHŪ] 3, 776 (Japan). The District Court decision preceding the 
Sunagawa Case was also called the “Date Decision,” named after presiding judge Akio Date. “Article 2 of 
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Court’s decision churned up controversy over Article 9 and the undefined 
boundary of judicial review.61  Addressing the dispute, SCJ took the case 
and overturned the district court, limiting the scope of judicial review on 
political question grounds.62  
The SCJ interpreted Article 9, Paragraph 2 as prohibiting the 
maintenance of war potential over which Japan exercises the right of 
command and supervision only, not the stationing of foreign armed forces in 
Japan. 63   Moreover, SCJ raised the political question doctrine without 
directly citing its name,64 declining to rule on the merits whether the SDF is 
unconstitutional under Article 9.65  
The Sunagawa Case’s majority noted that the issue of whether the 
stationing of U.S. armed forces under the 1952 United States-Japan Security 
Treaty conflicts with Article 9 featured “an extremely high degree of 
political consideration . . . there is a certain element of incompatibility in the 
process of judicial determination of its constitutionality by a court of law 
which has as its mission the exercise of the purely judicial function.”66  SCJ 
further indicated, “legal determination as to whether the content of the treaty 
is constitutional or not is . . . related to the high degree of political 
consideration or discretionary power on the part of the Cabinet . . . and 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Special Criminal Law Enacted in Consequence of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the 
Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America is null and void, as it contradicts Article 
31 of the Constitution on the premise that the stationing of the United States armed forces in Japan 
contravenes the provisions of the first part of paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution.”.   
61  Id. 
62  Declassified U.S. documents indicate SCJ Chief Justice Kotaro Tanaka conducted private 
correspondence with senior U.S. diplomats in Tokyo before trial in the Sunagawa Case, raising judicial 
independence and due process concerns.  See REIKO FUKAWA & TOSHIKAZU SHINOHARA, SUNAKAWA 
JIKEN TO TANAKA SAIKŌSAI CHOKAN AMERIKA KAIKIN BUNSHO GA AKIRAKA NI SHITA NIHON NO SHIHŌ 
[SUNAGAWA INCIDENT AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE TANAKA – THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVEALED AMERICAN CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT] 60–61 (2013). 
63  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). 
64  At least one scholar viewed the Sunagawa Case as a discretion theory case, rather than as political 
question doctrine case.  See Kakudo Toyoji, Tochi Koi [Political Question Doctrine], 638 JURIST 172, 173 
(1977).   
65  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan); Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52, at 95; Katsutoshi Katami, Hō Saikōsai 
tōchi [Law, Supreme Court, and Ruling], 87 HORITSU JIHO NO. 5, 50; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ 343 
(Takahashi Kazuyuki  rev. 6th ed. 2015). 
66  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). 
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. . . the Diet.”67  The Court concluded judicial restraint was proper because 
highly political considerations belong to the people.68   
As for drawing the boundary of judicial review on issues with a high 
degree of political consideration, SCJ held that the 1952 United States-Japan 
Security Treaty and the stationing of U.S. forces were not “obviously 
unconstitutional and void,” fell outside the scope of judicial review, and 
must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislature.69  Accordingly, 
SCJ has “avoided ruling upon the merits of constitutional challenges to 
Japan’s military activities and security arrangements under Article 9,” and 
ruled that the Tokyo District Court exceeded the scope of judicial review.70  
In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ set a landmark for the political question 
doctrine, straddling the competing ideas of judicial supremacy and the 
avoidance of judicial oligarchy.  The Court restricted judicial review of 
Article 9 challenges to those concerning the 1952 United States-Japan 
Security Treaty or the stationing of U.S. forces, and placed issues of “an 
extremely high degree of political consideration” outside the scope of 
Article 81’s judicial review power.71  For reviewable Article 9 issues (which 
exclude the constitutionality of the SDF), SCJ declared a clear mistake rule, 
deferring to the political branches so long as the act is “not obviously 
unconstitutional and void.”72  
C.  Evolution of the Political Question Doctrine After the 
Sunagawa Case 
After the Sunagawa Case, SCJ soon faced two questions:  whether the 
political question doctrine and its clear mistake rule would extend to other 
disputes of high political consideration, and whether it would bind all future 
Article 9 disputes.  As for other highly political disputes, one year after the 
Sunagawa Case, SCJ considered the issue of the procedure for dissolving 
the Diet in the Tomabechi Case, setting political questions criteria distinct 
                                                      
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id.  
70  Id.  
71  Tatsugoro Isozaki, Iwayuru tōchi kōi o kōtei suru gakusetsu no hihan [Criticism of Political 
Question Doctrine], 31 HANDAIHŌGAKU 8 (1959); NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 55, at 119; Yasuo 
Hasebe, supra note 56, at 44. 
72  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). 
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from Sunagawa.73  On August 28, 1952, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida 
dissolved the house of representatives pursuant to Article 7 of the Kenpō.74  
Representative Gizo Tomabechi challenged the dissolution and sued for his 
unpaid salary. 75   In 1953, the Tokyo District Court held the dissolution 
invalid because it was not made at a Cabinet meeting.76  In 1954, the Tokyo 
High Court reversed on appeal, ruling the Cabinet reached its decision in a 
legal manner, but rejecting the political question doctrine.77  
Representative Tomabechi appealed to SCJ.78  As in the Sunagawa 
Case, SCJ evoked the political question doctrine without directly naming 
it.79  SCJ held that judicial review should be precluded from touching action 
within the discretion of the political branches, including the Cabinet’s act of 
dissolving the Diet.80  The Court reasoned that this discretion should be 
viewed as subject to political accountability, controlled ultimately by the 
people.81  In the Tomabechi Case, although the spirit of the political question 
doctrine was retained, SCJ used new rationales and distinguished it from the 
Sunagawa Case in two ways.  First, SCJ did not mention the “not obviously 
unconstitutional and void” clear mistake rule.  Second, SCJ emphasized the 
rationales of separation of powers and political accountability to justify its 
exercise of judicial restraint.   
As to whether the Sunagawa Case and its clear mistake rule would 
bind future Article 9 disputes, SCJ and the lower courts distinguished those 
cases from the Tomabechi Case.  For cases that threatened to unleash an 
Article 9 issue, especially those challenging the constitutionality of Anpo 
and retaining U.S. forces in Japan, the application of the Sunagawa Case 
political question doctrine is binding.82  In short, a dual standard for political 
                                                      
73  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] (7) 
1206 (Japan). 
74  KENPŌ, art. 7, para. 1 (stating, “The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall 
perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people . . . Dissolution of the House of 
Representatives.”). 
75  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 7, 
1206 (Japan). 
76  Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1953, Sho 27 no. 156, 14 KAKYŪ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI SAIBAN REISŪ [KAKEISHŪ] 7, 1251 (Japan). 
77  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High. Ct.] Sep. 22, 1954, Sho 27 no. 2010, 14 KŌTŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [KOMINSHŪ] 7, 1265 (Japan).  
78  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 7, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1206 (Japan). 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id.  
82  Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52, at 94–95. 
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questions analysis bore over the lower courts.83  First, the Sunagawa Case’s 
clear mistake rule prevailed in Article 9 disputes including challenges to 
Anpo and stationing of U.S. forces. 84   Second, other disputes of high 
political consideration, such as the mutual relations between the political 
branches seen in the Tomabechi Case, are categorically precluded from 
judicial review.85 
Since the Sunagawa Case, SCJ has further split Article 9 disputes by 
subject matter.  First, on Anpo and the stationing of U.S. forces disputes, 
SCJ affirmed the Sunagawa Case as binding precedent.  SCJ cited the 
Sunagawa Case and adopted the political question doctrine and clear 
mistake rule, while refraining from ruling on the merits in the 1969 
Zenshihosendai Case,86 and the 1996 Okinawa Mandamus Case.87  As for 
disputes regarding SDF and its military base, while SCJ refrained from 
stepping in on the 1982 Naganuma Case88 and the 1989 Hyakuri Air Base 
                                                      
83  MASAYUKI ATARASHI, KENPŌ SOSHŌ-RON [CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] (377–381) (2d ed. 
2010); Masaomi Kimizuka, Tochi Koi-Ron Saikō —Aru Ga Nai [Reconsidering Political Question Doctrine 
—To Be or Not to Be], 22 YOKOHAMA L. REV. 33 (2013). 
84  Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52, 
85  Id.  
86  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 5, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 685 
(Japan) The defendants were employees in court and participated in a political strike against Anpo. The 
defendants were accused of violating National Public Service Law Article 98, paragraph 5 and article 110, 
paragraph 1, item 17, which imposed criminal liability on public officials involving in “striking, engaging 
in delaying acts or other acts of dispute, or from resorting to delaying tactics which reduce the efficiency of 
governmental operations, against the public as employer represented by the Government.”  These 
defendants were guilty in district court and high court.  SCJ dismissed the appeal.  As for the dispute 
concerning the constitutionality of Anpo, SCJ cited the Sunagawa Case as precedent, indicating “the Court 
should consider Anpo disputes prudentially because of their highly political considerations,” and holding 
the new Anpo was “not obviously unconstitutional and void,” and thus outside the scope of judicial review. 
87  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 28, 1996, 7, 50, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1952 (Japan) (After the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, Okinawan residents were furious with U.S. military 
forces.  Land owners rejected to renew their land lease where the U.S. forces bases were built.  Based on 
Articles 3 & 14 of the Special Measures Concerning Land for U.S. Armed Forces Law and Article 36, 
paragraph 5 of the Land Expropriation Law, the governor incurred a duty to proxy sign the lease extension.  
But the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Masahide Ota, refused to do so.  SCJ unanimously ruled the 
Japanese central government has authority to so act.  As for the dispute about the Japan–U.S. Security 
Treaty, SCJ formally cited the Sunagawa Case and ruled, “unless the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the 
Agreement on the Status of U.S. Armed Forces are obviously unconstitutional and void, the courts should 
examine whether the Special Measures concerning Land for U.S. 
Armed Forces Law is constitutional or not on the premise that the treaties are constitutional.”), http://www.
courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=268; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Japanese Court Rules Government 
Can Seize Land for U.S. Bases, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/29/world/jap
anese-court-rules-government-can-seize-land-for-us-bases.html.  
88  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 9, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1679 (Japan). In the Naganuma Case, the Sapporo District Court declined to apply the Sunagawa Case 
precedent, and ruled, the SDF constituted land, sea and air forces, in violation of Article 9, paragraph 2. See 
Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 7, 1973, 712 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 24 (Japan). The 
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Case, 89  the lower courts were divided between the political question 
doctrine,90 constitutional avoidance,91 and striking down the SDF.92    
D.  The Jurisprudence of Judicial Review and the Political 
Question Doctrine in Japan  
Most Japanese constitutional scholars approved of SCJ’s application 
of the political question doctrine in the Sunagawa Case utilizing three main 
rationales:  the prudential view,93 judicial competency,94 and separation of 
powers.95 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sapporo High Court, discussed the Sunagawa political question doctrine, but ultimately decided the case on 
the basis of standing, another obstacle to judicial review. See Sapporo Koto Saibansho [Sapporo High. Ct.] 
Aug. 5, 1976, 821 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 21 (Japan). The SCJ affirmed and rejected to review on the basis of 
lacking interests in case. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 9, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679 (Japan). 
89  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 1989, 6, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
385 (Japan) The issue in dispute was whether selling properties to the SDF was a violation of KENPŌ 
Article 9, and therefore grounds for rescission.  The district court adopted the political question doctrine 
and clear mistake rule, and rejected ruling the SDF unconstitutional.  The high court dismissed the appeal 
and ruled the SDF was neither antisocial nor against the public morality.  As a result, there was no cause 
for rescinding the sale. SCJ dismissed the appeal because “Article 9 is not applicable to actions of private 
parties.”  See GOODMAN, supra note 55, at 227. 
90  The appellate court in the Naganuma Case (Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High. Ct.] Aug. 5, 
1976, no. 821, 21 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan)), the district court in the Hyakuri Air Base (Mitoshi Chiho 
Saibansho [Mitoshi Dist. Ct.] Feb 17, 1977, no. 872, 22 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan)) and appellate court 
in the Atsugi Air Base (Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High. Ct.] Apr. 9, 1986, no. 1192, 1 HANREI JIHO 
[HANJI] (Japan)), adopted the political question doctrine and rejected an Article 9 argument challenging the 
legitimacy of SDF.      
91  The district court in the Eniwa Case. (The defendant, accused of cutting the phone lines of an SDF 
facility, was indicted by the Special Criminal Law, incriminating the act of destroying materials serving 
defensive purposes. The court held that the phone lines were not used for defense purposes and granted 
acquittal.) See also Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 29, 1967, 3, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 359 (Japan). 
92   The district court in the Naganuma Case. See Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 
7, 1973, 712 24, HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan), translation is available in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI 
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 83 (1996). 
93  Junjiro Yamada, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [The Political Question Doctrine], 13 KŌHŌ KENKYŪ 160 
(1955); HIDENORI TOMATSU, PUREPPU KENPŌ [PREP. CONSTITUTION] 135 (2007); NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, 
KENPŌ SOSHO RIRON [THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 428 (1973) [hereinafter KENPŌ 
SOSHO RIRON]. 
94  Hiroshi Hokama, Tochi koi ni tsuite [The Political Question Doctrine], 41 KOHO KENKYU 200 
(1979). 
95  Ogawa Ichiro, Tochi koi-ron [The Political Question Doctrine], GYOSEIHORI 119 (1986); Hiroshi 
Kaneko, Tochi koi no kenkyu [Research on the Political Question Doctrine], 72 KOKKAGAKKAI ZASSHI (9) 
1, 4 (1958); Toshio Irie, Tōchi kōi [The political question doctrine], 13 KOHO KENKYU 75, 90 (1955) 
[hereinafter Toshio Irie]; Tatsuhiko Yamamoto, Kokumin shuken to tōchi kōi [Popular Sovereignty and 
Political Question Doctrine], 729 HORITSU SEMINA 50 (Oct. 2015) (Professor Yamamoto and Justice Irie 
emphasized the rationale of popular sovereignty and political accountability to justify judicial restraint. But 
they seemed to overlook the issue of whether the Japanese electoral system, campaign strategies, and Diet 
are capable of reflecting the true voice of the Japanese people. See REIN TAAGEPERA & MATTHEW SOBERG 
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Prudential view scholars96 argue the political question doctrine is a 
political custom rather than a legal theory.97  Scholar Junjiro Yamada asserts 
the political question doctrine possesses characteristics of law and politics, 
yet is still within the scope of judicial examination.98  However, Yamada 
acknowledges the judiciary must exercise restraint and analyze both costs 
and benefits, and the likelihood of chaos a decision might entail when 
deciding whether to rule. 99   Aligning with the prudential view, scholar 
Nobuyoshi Ashibe favors a balancing test that considers the necessity of the 
protection of human rights, the political consequences of a decision, the risk 
of politicizing the judiciary, the limits of judicial competency, and the 
probability of enforcement.100  However, the prudential view draws criticism 
for failing to render clear guidance for drawing the boundary of judicial 
review in practice.101 
Other scholars agreed on the necessity of judicial restraint while 
focusing on the rationale of judicial competency.102  Under the influence of 
U.S. jurisprudence emphasizing judicial “passive virtues” and arguing for 
the importance of prudential considerations, these scholars pay close 
attention to judicially discoverable and manageable standards.103  Assessing 
judicial competency through this lens, these scholars mainly agree that the 
Sunagawa Case’s clear mistake rule is appropriate.104 
The third rationale, separation of powers, has been adopted by many 
Japanese scholars.105  Scholar Hiroshi Kaneko and Justice Irie argue that 
                                                                                                                                                              
SHUGART, SEATS A VOTES: THE EFFECTS AND DETERMINATION OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 77–81 (1989)); 
ELLIS KRAUSS AND ROBBERT J. PEKKANEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN'S LDP: POLITICAL PARTY 
ORGANIZATIONS AS HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONS 100, 128 (2011). 
96  See Kineko Kubota, Amerika kenpō ni okeru seijimondai [Political Questions in the U.S. 
Constitution], 13 KOHO KENKYU [Public Law Research] 168, 173 (1955); Masami Ito, KENPŌ [THE 
CONSTITUTION] 636 (3d ed. 1995); Akira Nishio, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [About Political Question Doctrine], 5 
DOSHISHA HOGAKU, 113 (1976). 
97  HIDENORI TOMATSU, supra note 93, at 135; HIDENORI TOMATSU, SHIHŌ SHINSA-SEI [THE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM] 171 (1989).  
98  Junjiro Yamada, supra note 93, at 108. 
99  Id. at 78, 85. 
100  NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 93, at 428; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 55, at 137. 
101  MASANARI SAKAMOTO, KENPŌ RIRON I [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY I] 426 (3d ed. 2000); Toyoji 
Kakudo, Tōchi Kōi [Political Question Doctrine], 638 JURIST 176 (1977). 
102   Hiroshi Hokama, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [About the Political Question Doctrine], 41 KŌHŌ KENKYŪ 
200 (1979). 
103  KŌJI SATŌ, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 357 (1995). 
104  YŌICHI HIGUCHI, KENPŌ IV [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IV] 150 (2004). 
105 ISAO SATŌ, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 477 (5th ed. 
1996); KAZUHIRO NAGAO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 243 (4th ed. 2011). 
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because the Kenpō designates a democratic government, the people must 
ultimately speak on issues of high political consideration and maintain 
control of the political branches. 106    This formulation of separation of 
powers is coupled with the concept of popular sovereignty and commits 
political matters to the political branches rather than the unelected judicial 
branch, distinguishing it from its U.S. counterpart which emphasizes 
constitutional structure and grants of power.107  
Opposing the consensus among most scholars that the Japanese 
political question doctrine is legitimate, scholars Tatsugorō Isozaki108 and 
Yasuo Sugihara 109  strictly adhere to the Kenpō’s text and argue for 
constitutional supremacy.110  Article 81 unequivocally names SCJ the court 
of last resort to determine constitutionality in all disputes, distinguishing it 
from the U.S. Constitution.111  Analyzing the Kenpō’s unique structure and 
text, these scholars argue that the U.S. political question doctrine is a poor 
tool for interpreting the Kenpō. 112   To the extent the political question 
doctrine has a constitutional rationale, it supports strong judicial review 
because the framers expressly vested final interpretive power of the Kenpō 
with SCJ rather than the people.113  The scholar Setsu Kobayashi adds an 
originalist argument, observing that prior to World War II, the political 
branches wielded final decision-making power and proceeded to eviscerate 
the Meiji Constitution.  To Kobayashi, this historical lesson underpins the 
collective intent of the Kenpō’s framers to have an independent judiciary and 
a functioning system of checks and balances.  Kobayashi argues that a 
political question doctrine that narrows judicial review is inconsistent with 
the Kenpō framers’ intent.114    
While SCJ adopted its political question doctrine based on separation 
of powers and prudential rationales with few other developments, the U.S. 
                                                      
106  Toshio Irie, supra note 95, at 91 (Justice Irie conceded that the best way to accomplish political 
accountability is via public referendum and the general election is an alternative when the public 
referendum has not yet been established); Hiroshi Kaneko, supra note 95, at 1, 4.   
107  Toshio Irie, supra note 95, at 91; Hiroshi Kaneko, supra note 95, at 1, 4. 
108  Tatsugorō Isozaki, Iwayuru tōchi kōi to waga kuni kenpō [The Political Question Doctrine and the 
Japanese Constitution], 39 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI 867, 871–72 (1959). 
109  YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II] 372 (1989). 
110  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 1 (“This Constitution shall be the 
supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part 
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.”). 
111  Tatsugorō Isozaki, supra note 108, at 871–72. 
112  Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 70; SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46, at139–41. 
113  Tatsugorō Isozaki, supra note 71, at 27. 
114  SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46, at 141 (reasoning that compromised judicial power is 
inconsistent with the framers’ intent). 
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political question doctrine evolved in phases leading up to the 1962 
landmark case Baker v. Carr in which it was restated.115  Before discussing 
how SCJ may adopt lessons from the U.S. in its approach to the 2014 
reinterpretation controversy, an overview of judicial review and the political 
question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court is in order. 
II.  JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 
The U.S. acted as transplant donor for judicial review in Japan and 
may similarly serve as a useful model for developing Japan’s political 
question doctrine.  Reviewing the evolution of judicial review in the U.S. 
Supreme Court will provide a basis for competing views of its political 
question doctrine.  Corresponding to the development of the judicial review, 
this part analyzes the trend of the U.S. political question doctrine and its 
jurisprudential changes.  
A. The Origin of Judicial Review in the U.S. Supreme Court  
Ratified in 1788, the U.S. Constitution omits any express grant of 
judicial review to the Supreme Court.116  Its text develops little about the 
Supreme Court, inviting over two centuries of argument over the Court’s 
proper role.117  The 1803 case Marbury v. Madison is commonly viewed as 
the first time the U.S. Supreme Court exercised judicial review to declare an 
act of Congress unconstitutional. 118   Chief Justice John Marshall 
emphasized, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial 
Department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws 
conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.”119  
                                                      
115  Zachary Baron Shemtob, The Political Question Doctrines: Zivotofsky v. Clinton and Getting 
Beyond the Textual—Prudential Paradigm, 104 GEO. L. J. 1001, 1007 (2016); Larry D. Kramer, Judicial 
Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 625–31 (2012). 
116 Compare U.S. CONST. art. III (omitting a judicial review provision), with NIHONKOKU KENPŌ 
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81, para. 1 (granting this power expressly to the SCJ). 
117 See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 3–10 (rev. ed. 1994). 
118  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175–78 (1803); see also Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional 
Applications of the Supreme Court of Japan, in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: FUNCTION, IMPACT, AND 
CHALLENGES 237, 237 (2016); But cf. Norikazu Kawagishi, The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan, 5 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 308, 330 (2007), http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/308.full (describing the 1948 
Placard Case, in which SCJ declined to rule on the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing criticism of 
the Emperor, instead dismissing an appeal of conviction on a technicality). 
119  Marbury, at 177. 
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Ever since, the Supreme Court retained the power to declare a law 
unconstitutional.120  
B. Three Views on the Role of Judicial Review in the Supreme 
Court 
Observing judicial review’s uneven history in the U.S., three main 
schools of thought developed characterizing its proper level of activity.121  
The “classical theory” emphasizes judicial restraint based on popular 
sovereignty and prioritizes the politically elected branches. 122   “Passive 
virtues” emphasize prudential considerations in selecting cases with an eye 
toward maintaining legitimacy with the public. 123  Finally, proponents of 
robust judicial review emphasize the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
land that must supersede conflicting laws.124  
1. The Classical Theory and the Rule of the Clear Mistake  
The “classical theory” of judicial review emphasizes the Court’s 
unelected status as a reason for it to be highly deferential and to let 
reasonable acts of Congress stand. 125   In 1893, scholar James Bradley 
Thayer recommended that courts “can only disregard [an] Act [of Congress] 
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a 
mistake, but have made a very clear one, — so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.”126  Thayer cautions that they must not “step into the shoes 
of the law-maker.”127  In this view, a “distinction between what is merely 
incorrect and what is unreasonable” must be recognized.128  The classical 
theory and Thayer’s “rule of the clear mistake” fell out of favor with an 
                                                      
120  See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
887, 981 (2003). 
121  See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 5 (1986); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
122  See BICKEL, supra note 121, at 17. 
123  Id.  
124  See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1972). 
125  See BICKEL, supra note 121, at 21–40 (describing Thayer’s theory).  
126  Thayer, supra note 121, at 144. 
127  Id. at 152. 
128  Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 522 (2012) 
(explaining Thayer’s theory). 
April 2017    Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle? 367 
 
 
ascendant Warren Court in the 1960s, and has yet to regain a foothold in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.129  
2.  The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Prudential 
Factors  
Alternatives to the strict classical theory emerged as civil rights issues 
fueled more active judicial review in the Warren Court.130  However, judicial 
review is suspect because when the Supreme Court strikes down a law, it 
“exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.”131  
Scholar Alexander Bickel argued for limited yet authoritative use of judicial 
review to address this “counter-majoritarian difficulty” wherein unelected 
officials make final decisions overturning the elected branches.132  Bickel 
contends the judiciary should avoid deciding controversies when judges lack 
knowledge or expertise, political backlash from the public is likely, and 
when the Court might invite conflicts with another branch. 133   Bickel’s 
passive virtues may best be characterized in Supreme Court jurisprudence by 
Justice Louis Brandeis’ 1936 concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority.134  Justice Brandeis lays out prudential rules for deciding 
when to exercise judicial review that are not found in the Constitution’s 
text.135  Bickel believed that regularly exercising passive virtues to dodge 
controversial decisions builds the Court’s legitimacy with the public.136  
3.  Robust Judicial Review   
Comparatively, proponents of robust judicial review contend the 
Supreme Court legitimately claims the final say on constitutional 
interpretation and fulfills its proper role when deciding controversial 
issues.137  Robust judicial review embraces the Court’s role as a policy-
making body because the political branches historically have failed to 
                                                      
129  See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring federal courts “supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution . . . ”). 
130  BICKEL, supra note 121, at 36–7.  
131  Id. at 120.  
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 111–83. 
134  Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1994).  
135  Id. at 1016–17 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936)). 
136  BICKEL, supra note 121, at 200.  
137  See generally Larry D. Kramer, supra note 115, at 625–31.  
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vindicate minority rights.138  In 1959, scholar Herbert Weschler formulated a 
version of robust judicial review wherein, “courts have both the title and the 
duty. . . to review the actions of the other branches in the light of 
constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices.”139  
In 1968, scholar Archibald Cox approvingly wrote, “[j]udges do make law, 
they have no choice but to make law, their law making is and should be a 
reflection of their views on public policy.”140  A Supreme Court exercising 
robust judicial review is confident in its role as policymaker, aptly 
describing the Court’s general temperament since the Warren Court.141  
C.  Political Question Doctrine Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme 
Court  
With the differing rationales of the competing schools of thought 
regarding the role of judicial review in mind, we turn to the application of 
the political question doctrine in the U.S.142  The political question doctrine 
precludes entire subject areas from being decided on the merits despite a 
case satisfying all other tests of justiciability, such as standing, mootness, 
and ripeness.143  This method of avoiding controversial rulings is considered 
a rule of judicial restraint rather than procedure,144 based on two ideas:  (1) 
the Constitution grants the political branches certain powers the Court 
cannot question; and (2) the political branches are best equipped to remedy 
particular issues.145 
1.  The Classical Political Question Doctrine 
The origin of the political question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme 
Court can be traced to Marbury, applied narrowly when the Constitution 
                                                      
138  Edwin W. Tucker, Book Review, 41 IND. L. J. 330, 333 (1966) (reviewing MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW 
AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964)). 
139  Wechsler, supra note 121, at 19. 
140  Martin Shapiro, Book Review, 31 J. POL. 853, 853 (1969) (reviewing ARCHIBALD COX, THE 
WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968)). 
141  Kramer, supra note 115, at 630–31. 
142  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 130–31 (2011).  
143  Id. 
144  Margit Cohn, Form, Formula and Constitutional Ethos: The Political Question/Justiciability 
Doctrine in Three Common Law Systems, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 677 (2011).  
145  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 131 (noting that while scholars disagree about the doctrine’s 
validity and wisdom, they agree that its definition and scope have changed over time). 
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expressly vests plenary power with the president.146  Chief Justice Marshall 
held that certain executive actions are not subject to judicial review because: 
[W]here the heads of departments . . . act in cases in which the 
executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing 
can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. . . .The province of the court is, solely, 
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the 
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, 
can never be made in this court.147  
This formulation became known as the “classical political question 
doctrine” and is closely tied to the Constitution’s text. 148   Under this 
doctrine, controversial issues are categorically excluded from justiciability 
when the Constitution vests plenary discretion with the President such as in 
foreign affairs—but not to vindicate individual rights. 149   Marshall’s 
classical doctrine was limited by a textual constitutional grant of power in 
specified areas of policy. 150   U.S. scholars acknowledge the classical 
political question doctrine to employ a separation of powers rationale.151  
2. The Rise and Fall of the Prudential Political Question 
Doctrine  
After Marbury, the textual scope of political questions gradually came 
to include prudential factors.152  Prudential factors are various, including the 
sensitivity of involved national interests, and whether there are clearly 
established legal standards for the issue.153  Prudential factors first emerged 
                                                      
146  Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and 
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2002).  
147  Marbury, at 166–70 (1803). 
148  See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE 
L. J. 517, 518 (1966) (coining the term “classical theory” to describe the political question doctrine when 
referring to the Marbury version). 
149  JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43834, THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: 
JUSTICIABILITY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 3 (2014). 
150  Barkow, supra note 146, at 239; Marbury, at 163–70. 
151  Carol Szurkowski, The Return of Classical Political Question Doctrine in Zivotofsky Ex. Rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 353 (2014). 
152  COLE, supra note 149, at 4; See also Barkow, supra note 146, at 255–57.  
153  Szurkowski, supra note 151, at 353. 
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alongside the classical doctrine in the 1849 case Luther v. Borden.154  The 
Court deferred to Congress advancing two main rationales: (1) the 
legislative branch possesses sole constitutional authority to decide this 
matter; and (2) “prudential considerations,” including the likely chaos that 
would result from a decision.155   
The first half of the Twentieth Century saw the Supreme Court 
demure on political representation cases.156  In 1912, the Court elevated 
prudential considerations in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 
Oregon, relying on the far-reaching effects of a decision more than on 
constitutional text and structure.157  The Court conceded the “great variety of 
relevant conditions, political, social and economic” put it out of its depth and 
decided it could not distill a standard, holding, “the lack of criteria for a 
judicial determination” is a “dominant consideration” in deciding whether an 
issue is a political question.158  The Court introduced the judiciary’s limited 
institutional capacity as a prudential factor in the 1946 congressional 
redistricting case Colegrove v. Green. 159   Colegrove was an electoral 
malapportionment case in which rural individuals were vastly 
overrepresented.160  Justice Frankfurter’s plurality insisted the Court should 
opt “not to enter th[e] political thicket,” and designated the redrawing of 
congressional districts as outside the Court’s competence. 161   Justice 
Frankfurter notes Congress’s express constitutional power to regulate the 
type of election at issue in Colegrove, and his judgment turns on the 
prudential consideration of the Court’s inability to remedy the injury at 
issue.162 
3.  Baker v. Carr: Reframing the Political Question Doctrine 
In 1962, the Supreme Court dramatically reformulated the political 
                                                      
154  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 10 (1849) (deciding that whether a State has exercised proper 
maintenance of “a republican form of government” as required by the Constitution is a question left to 
Congress).  
155  Id.; COLE, supra note 149, at 4 (the issue in Luther v. Borden asked the Court to determine the 
legitimate government of a sovereign state, likely to result in chaos if decided).  
156  COLE, supra note 149, at 4. 
157  Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 141–42 (1912) (holding that whether the state 
of Oregon’s initiative and referendum system was consistent with the Constitution’s “republican form of 
government” Guaranty Clause requirement is a political question).  
158  Id. at 453–55. 
159  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
160  Id. at 550–51; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142 (explaining Frankfurter’s plurality opinion).   
161  Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. 
162  Barkow, supra note 146, at 239 (explaining Frankfurter’s plurality opinion, stating the Court had 
no ability to remedy voter dilution relative to Congress.). 
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question doctrine in Baker v. Carr. 163   Though Colegrove found that 
apportionment of state congressional voting districts is a political question, 
the Court found in Baker that a similar issue, framed differently, was not a 
political question.164  Baker reinforced that the political question doctrine is 
“primarily a function of the separation of powers.”165  Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion lays out a six-factor test to help guide the Court in making 
the determination, examining whether there is:  
[1] [a] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] 
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.166 
In Baker, Brennan attempted to craft, for the first time, a unified 
political question doctrine.167  The first factor focuses on the constitutional 
text granting other branches specific powers the judiciary may not question, 
as in Luther.168  The second factor is primarily structural and alludes to the 
competencies of the other branches, as in Coleman.169  The final four factors 
are prudential considerations, cautioning against an unelected court tackling 
highly political issues.170 
D.  The Political Question Doctrine After Baker  
After Baker, the Supreme Court narrowed the influence of prudential 
factors in political questions analysis.171  In more contemporary analyses, 
                                                      
163  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
164  Id. at 208–09. 
165  Id. at 210.  
166  Id. at 217.  
167  Shemtob, supra note 115, at 1007.   
168  Id.  
169  Id.  
170  Id.    
171  Barkow, supra note 146, at 267–76; See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) 
(holding that whether Congress had the authority to deny seating a duly elected member was not a political 
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prudential factors are rarer, despite the Baker test officially endorsing 
them.172  While the Baker test includes both textual and prudential factors, 
the balance between them remained a puzzle for over fifty years.173  The 
treatment of the political question doctrine itself has likewise narrowed in 
applicable scope since Baker. 174   Between the 1962 Baker decision and 
2016, the Supreme Court discussed the political question doctrine in thirty-
eight cases, finding a nonjusticiable political question only twice.175  In Bush 
v. Gore (2000), the Court’s decision determined the outcome of a 
presidential election. 176  Justice Breyer’s Bush v. Gore dissent embraced 
Frankfurter and Bickel’s prudential analysis and passive virtues, arguing that 
the case’s political nature made it nonjusticiable.177  Bickel’s passive virtues, 
to be deployed when a case threatens the Court’s legitimacy with the public, 
were laid to rest in Bush v. Gore, and have yet to be revived.178 
Since John Roberts was seated as Chief Justice in 2005, the Court has 
yet to find a political question.  The Roberts Court notably found no political 
question and ignored Baker’s prudential factors in the 2012 case Zivotofsky 
v. Clinton, deciding that whether an individual has the right to have 
“Jerusalem, Israel” listed as a place of birth on a passport when the State 
Department took no stance on Jerusalem’s political status, was not a political 
question. 179   In Zivotofsky, the Roberts majority held that the political 
question doctrine is a “narrow exception” to the general rule that “the 
Judiciary has the responsibility to decide cases properly before it.”180  The 
Court relied on the first two Baker factors only and held a political question 
exists “where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
                                                                                                                                                              
question); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (relegating consideration of prudential factors to 
concurring opinions, and not as part of central holding); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) 
(finding a political question based on a textually demonstrable commitment of impeachment power granted 
to the legislature and lack of manageable and discoverable standards for judicial management of 
impeachment proceedings; not prudential factors); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (finding no political 
question over strong dissent that prudential factors weighed against hearing  case that would decide a 
presidential election). See also Shemtob, supra note 115, at 1010 (explaining only two cases have found 
political questions since Baker, neither of which was decided on prudential grounds). 
172  Shemtob, supra note 115, at 1008.  
173  Id. 
174  Barkow, supra note 146, at 267–68. 
175  See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (finding supervision of the military was solely 
within the constitutional power of the executive and legislative branches); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224, 226-38 (1993) (finding review of impeachment proceedings solely within Congress’s constitutional 
power and outside the scope of the judiciary).  
176  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Barkow, supra note 146, at 273–74. 
177 Bush, at 156-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
178  Shemtob, supra note 115, at 1014.  
179  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
180  Id. at 194. 
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the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”181  The majority’s 
conspicuous omission of Baker’s prudential factors sparked debate over the 
Baker test’s viability going forward.182 
As robust judicial review ascended in the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
political question doctrine receded.  The political question doctrine may yet 
again transform after Zivotofsky, but the Court’s turn toward a textual and 
structural focus is significant. 183   In the four most recent cases that 
considered finding a political question, appeals to text and structure 
dominated and prudential considerations were relegated concurrences or 
dissents.184  The judicial restraint of Thayer and Bickel, and the importance 
of prudential considerations in political questions analysis have been mostly 
cast aside.185  The Zivotofsky majority’s exclusive focus on text and structure 
throws the future prudential factors into doubt. 186   The jurisprudential 
changes that have shaped the political question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme 
Court from Baker to Zivotofsky present a model SCJ might consider when in 
its approach the 2014 reinterpretation.   
III. THE SCJ COULD RESTATE AND CLARIFY ITS POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE AND REEXAMINE ITS APPLICATION  
   Developments in the U.S. political question doctrine can act as a 
guide to SCJ as it navigates the complex and unique context of Kenpō 
Article 9 disputes in this critical moment.  We recommend that SCJ restate 
and clarify its political question doctrine.  We also recommend that SCJ 
consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of robust judicial review and its 
political questions development from Baker through Zivotofsky.  These 
recommendations stem from our analysis that SCJ has undervalued the text 
history, and checks and balances of the Kenpō, and overemphasized 
prudential consideration in its political questions analysis.187  The benefits of 
                                                      
181  Zivotofsky, at 195 (citing Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
182  Shemtob, supra note 115, at 1009.  
183  Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 522 
(2012). 
184  Zivotofsky, 566 U.S., at 189; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).   
185  Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and 
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1233 (2002). 
186  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Zivotofsky, 566 U.S., at 189. 
187  See supra Part I sub. A and I sub. D; see also supra Part II sub. D.  
374 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 26 NO. 2 
 
our approach are two-fold.  First, because finding a political question 
precludes judicial review, a clarified political question doctrine will help to 
restore judicial checks and balances on the executive.  Second, we believe a 
more active SCJ can encourage a deep dialogue between the government and 
the people to deliberate national security strategies and move Japan forward.   
A. Clarifying the SCJ Political Question Doctrine 
We recommend SCJ clarify the political question doctrine by restating 
it in a judicial opinion that includes:  1) elaborating the role separation of 
powers plays in political questions analysis; 2) determining what, if any, 
relation the clear mistake rule bears to the political question doctrine; and 3) 
consideration of the weight SCJ will give to the Kenpō’s text, history, and 
structure when determining whether a political question exists.  This 
restatement will align the Japanese political question doctrine with the 
Kenpō’s text and structure as the U.S. Supreme Court did in its treatment of 
Baker in Zivotofsky. 
1. Elaborating the Spirit of Separation of Powers: Checks 
and Balances 
   First, SCJ can begin restating its political question doctrine by 
clarifying the role of separation of powers.  Clarifying separation of powers 
includes SCJ defining its own role as constitutional interpreter, defining 
when another branch is constitutionally empowered to act, and addressing 
the checks and balances interplay between them.  The first power SCJ 
should define is its own judicial review power under Article 81.  In the U.S., 
the political question doctrine primarily operates as a function of separation 
of powers, not as a political confrontation escape pod. 188   Article 81 
expressly grants SCJ the power of interpreting the Kenpō. 189   The War 
Potential Clause prohibits maintaining war potential.190  Nowhere does the 
Kenpō provide that executive power regarding foreign as well as national 
security policy and treaties is immune from judicial review.  Yet in the 
Sunagawa Case, SCJ cites “an extremely high degree of political 
consideration” as a valid reason not to rule on the merits.191  The Kenpō’s 
history shows it was designed to vest judicial review with SCJ, the framers’ 
                                                      
188  See Id. 
189  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81, para. 1 (Japan). 
190  Id. at art. 9, para. 2. 
191  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Shō 34 (a) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). 
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chosen final interpreter.192  
  Next in its separation of powers clarification, SCJ should define the 
constitutional powers of the other branches in a given arena.  Deference for 
the sake of political stability that does not identify the branch empowered by 
the Kenpō to make final decisions on a given issue weakens separation of 
powers analysis.  In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ announced it would defer to 
the political branches as long as the act is “not obviously unconstitutional 
and void.” 193   The Sunagawa Case has been regarded as a precedent 
effectively precluding SCJ and lower courts from hearing disputes regarding 
Anpo and the stationing of U.S. Forces.  We have examined the U.S. 
Supreme Court examples of Marbury and Zivotofsky, discussing when a 
constitutional provision empowers the executive to act; this is an appropriate 
place to begin political questions analysis.  Baker and Zivotofsky affirm the 
political question doctrine is primarily a function of separation of powers.  
This example can be useful to SCJ because defining the powers of each 
branch helps clarify when the judicial branch encounters a political question 
that lies outside its power of judicial review. 
   After defining its own power and that of the separate branches, SCJ 
should then identify the checks and balances between them.  SCJ employed 
the separation of powers rationale in the Tomabechi Case, designating 
relations between the political branches as outside the scope of judicial 
review.  But SCJ has not identified the role of checks and balances between 
the branches.  A focus on highly politicized issues instead of checks and 
balances as determined by the Kenpō should be reconsidered. Eviscerating 
checks and balances will block the flow of dialogue among the three 
branches, and between the government and the people.  While SCJ is under 
no obligation to adopt the U.S. version of political questions, the doctrine’s 
driving force, checks and balances, is baked into both the Kenpō and U.S. 
Constitution, and is a principle worth clarifying. 
2. Clarifying the Clear Mistake Rule’s Relationship to 
Political Questions  
   Second in its political questions restatement, SCJ should clarify the 
                                                      
192  See KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at 245; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], 
art. 81, para. 1 (Japan). 
193  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 3225. (Japan). 
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relationship between the political question doctrine and the clear mistake 
rule.  SCJ’s Article 9 jurisprudence would benefit from severing the clear 
mistake rule from the political question doctrine.  The Sunagawa Case’s 
clear mistake rule precedent, cited in the Zeshihosendai Case and the 
Okinawa Mandamus Case, has entrenched the clear mistake rule in Article 9 
jurisprudence on the Anpo and stationing of U.S. troops issues. There is no 
analogue in modern U.S. Supreme Court political questions jurisprudence, 
where the clarity required has trended toward which branches is 
constitutionally authorized to act.  Because the U.S. clear mistake rule as 
formulated by Thayer does not place subject matter off limits and its 
political question doctrine does, SCJ’s potent combination of the two in the 
Sunagawa Case demands clarification on their relationship.  In the U.S. 
Supreme Court, if a political branch is acting without express constitutional 
authority, the Court is capable of deciding the case, and prudential factors 
weigh in favor of a decision, then the mistake’s degree of clarity is 
inapposite.  SCJ may clarify that the clear mistake rule’s application to 
Article 9 cases is in fact not political questions analysis.  Such clarification 
would at least uncouple these potent barriers to judicial review.  
3.  Weighing Text and History Against Prudential 
Considerations 
Third, SCJ’s political questions opinion should consider the weight 
given to textual and historical factors in political question analysis.  There is 
no question that some prudential factors, particularly the likelihood of 
resulting chaos and potential inconsistent declarations from another branch, 
are potentially important to SCJ. 194   However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
provides a model where prudential factors do not predominate over the 
textual and structural factors.  While the prudential consideration seems still 
influential in Article 9 cases,195 the U.S. Supreme Court has shown political 
questions jurisprudence can shift away from prudential factors in stages.  
Prudential considerations were four of six of factors announced in the Baker 
test, yet had vanished from the Court’s analysis in Zivotofsky.  The Court’s 
emphasis on checks and balances may have helped facilitate the Zivotofsky 
shift.  
  The SCJ is not bound by prudential considerations and retains a plain 
text and rich history that would support a shift away from them.  If SCJ were 
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195  See infra Part ID.   
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to consider the historical drafting process of Article 81, this history would 
provide strong support for a textual and historical restatement of the political 
question doctrine.  This history strongly suggests SCJ was intended to 
decide controversial cases and has been almost completely ignored in SCJ 
analysis. Article 81 designates SCJ the “court of last resort” and may choose 
whether textual and historical considerations are dominant or prudential 
considerations are dominant.  While declaring either as dominant in a 
judicial opinion will clarify this issue, anointing textual and historical factors 
as dominant will allow SCJ to unleash the unusual history of judicial 
review’s establishment in Japan to bolster its credibility as final interpreter 
of the Kenpō.  
Japanese prudential view scholars might argue that judicial 
determination of political disputes regarding Article 9 threaten to damage 
the judiciary’s legitimacy with the public and draw indifference from the 
political branches.  However, we believe this is worth the risk for three 
reasons.  First, these concerns might be mere speculation lacking solid 
ground that result in judicial abdication and causing more serious chaos and 
instability.  Second, public reliance on the judicial branch should be based 
on sound, convincing, reasoning of the decision, rather than judicial 
abdication.  Third, the legal effect of a hypothetical 2014 Reinterpretation 
decision would merely be bound to that specific case, rather than imposing 
general effects. 
   Clarifying and restating a political questions test that includes discussion 
of separation of powers and the clear mistake rule, and also considers how it 
wishes to weigh textual and historical versus prudential factors will help 
provide guidance for future political questions cases.  Applying a test that 
focuses on specific provisions of the Kenpō to both Article 9 cases is an 
important step in removing the political questions barrier. 
B.   Reexamining the Political Question Doctrine in Light of U.S. 
Political Question Developments 
We also suggest SCJ may benefit from observing post-Baker 
developments of political questions jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  SCJ may benefit by:  1) considering adopting a new political 
questions test aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Baker 
developments; and 2) considering hearing a challenge to the 2014 
reinterpretation to develop a new test.  
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  First, SCJ may examine U.S. political questions jurisprudence from 
Baker through Zivotofsky to get a sense of what action fits its goals.  
Observing the way the Zivotofsky Court took the unranked Baker factors and 
favored text as opposed to prudential factors could lead to strategic insights 
on the weight of Kenpō’s text and structure.  It was unclear for many years 
after Baker how the balance between textual and prudential factors would 
play out.  Its multi-factor test allows the Court to determine the weight of the 
factors, either by express announcement, or in subsequent interpretation.  
While prudential considerations will always necessarily depend on the 
circumstances, the text and history of the Kenpō will always be available to 
anchor a political questions opinion.  As a preliminary step, these factors 
could find their way into a restated political questions standard.  A carefully 
chosen and clearly stated test can help clear the political questions hurdle to 
hear a challenge to the 2014 CLB reinterpretation, or to subsequent Article 9 
controversies. 
   Second, in order to move toward fulfilling its designed institutional 
function as final interpreter of the Kenpō, SCJ may decide to hear an Article 
9 challenge to the 2014 CLB reinterpretation. Baker itself did not decide the 
substantive issue when it announced its political questions test.196 SCJ can 
hear a 2014 reinterpretation challenge in order to equip itself with a clarified 
and unified restatement of the political question doctrine.  This will help 
facilitate a constructive dialogue between the government and the people.  In 
doing so, it may seek to develop its own navigable and manageable political 
questions test to achieve political stability in the modern day. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
   In the seventy years since the 1947 transplant of judicial review from 
the U.S. into Japan, SCJ has referenced foreign judicial experience and built 
its own model of the political question doctrine. 197   SCJ, like the U.S. 
Supreme Court, struggled with the issues of the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty and drawing the boundary of judicial review to balance power with 
the political branches.   
   In this comment, we argue that under the Kenpō’s text, its framers’ 
intent, and the Court’s institutional function, SCJ could play an active role as 
final interpreter of the Kenpō and offer solid guidance to settle the political 
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instability brought on by Article 9 controversies.  The Kenpō’s text and 
institutional function designate the Kenpō the supreme law of Japan, and 
textually grant SCJ the power to be its final interpreter.198  The framers, 
including Japanese scholars on the Matsumoto Committee, politicians, and 
the experts within the GS and SCAP, all agreed on adopting judicial review 
without restriction and without interference from the Diet.  
  One major obstacle to clarifying the effect of the 2014 reinterpretation 
on Article 9 is the 1959 Sunagawa Case’s political questions precedent.  In 
subsequent cases, SCJ has undervalued the Kenpō’s text and history and 
overvalued other factors.  Political questions jurisprudence in the U.S. 
Supreme Court could help provide an example to narrow the political 
question doctrine.  Restating a standard that clarifies the separation of 
powers including checks and balances, the clear mistake rule’s role, and 
strategically considers textual and historical factors will represent an 
important first step.  Announcing this standard after hearing a challenge to 
the 2014 Reinterpretation with an understanding of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s political questions experience to balance the factors of history, text 
and judicial prudence after Baker is another step toward clearing the political 
questions hurdle. And we sincerely believe a more active SCJ can encourage 
a deep dialogue between the government and the people to form a new 
consensus on its national security strategies and move Japan forward.     
   
  
                                                      
198  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 76, 81, 98 (Japan). 
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